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-  
Abstract 
 
In a knowledge-based economy, knowledge has 
become the most important source for competitive 
advantage.  Thus, organizations spend more attention 
on the protection of knowledge and also research on 
knowledge protection has gained increasing attention 
in the past years. However, knowledge protection 
research mainly focuses on the design of preventive 
measures and little is published about real incidents 
or reactive measures. Learning from failure and from 
incidents is important to improve current practice. 
This paper reflects on four cases of real knowledge 
risk incidents. We discuss ways to prevent or delay 
knowledge spillovers and the importance of knowing 
the threats in order to prevent them. In addition to 
preventive measures, we highlight that companies 
need to have reactive measures in place. Finally, 
based on our insights we discuss why analyzing 
incidents in addition to identified threats is important 
for practice as well as academia. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Researchers widely acknowledge that knowledge 
is strategically the most significant resource and 
therefore needs to be protected [22] from loss, 
obsolescence, unauthorized exposure, unauthorized 
modification, and erroneous assimilation [14] 
Scholars argue, that firms’ competitive advantages 
depend on their ability to protect their critical 
knowledge [24]. Hence, the importance of knowledge 
protection is widely emphasized and its strategic 
nature is exposed [26]. 
Despite general remarks why knowledge 
protection is important, not much is published about 
real consequences of the realization of knowledge 
risks. For the risk of losing knowledge inside the 
company, e.g., due to employee retirement, studies try 
to quantify the impact of knowledge loss and suggest 
that knowledge loss causes organizational problems 
like low productivity or reduced moral [31], others 
investigate the relationship between knowledge loss 
and performance [25] or the skills of responsible staff 
[19]. Also for risk of losing reputation some studies 
can be found [e.g. 36, 42]. Of the risk of unwanted 
knowledge spillovers and thus the risk of losing the 
exclusiveness of knowledge very little is known of the 
actual consequences of risk incidents. Scholars 
describe the impact in general terms, like “competitors 
use this knowledge to gain competitive advantage” [9] 
or assume that the impact is obvious, like 
“consequences are easy to imagine” [10] and thus does 
not need to be described further. Although it may be 
easy to imagine different consequences, learning from 
incidents requires describing and analyzing the 
consequences in detail. 
Reporting about concrete failures is frequently 
avoided as this is connotated with a blaming and hence 
it is difficult to investigate concrete incidents. This is 
particularly true for knowledge risks as they have a 
strong link to the competitiveness of the company due 
to the strategic and competitive importance of 
knowledge. Research shows that managers assume 
reporting about such incidents will have negative 
effects on investors and the firm's reputation [35]. 
Despite the challenges, it seems that investigating 
real knowledge risk incidents provide an important 
research opportunity on the one hand and has a high 
relevance for practice on the other hand. In general, 
systematic research on failure provides valuable 
insights for research as well as for practice [13]. This 
leads to the research question of this paper: 
  
RQ: What are concrete knowledge risk incidents 
and what can we learn from such incidents? 
  
To answer the research question, the authors first 
review the existing literature on knowledge protection 
with a focus on knowledge risk incidents. Based on 
this review the authors conduct a secondary data 
analysis of interview material collected in three studies 
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focusing on knowledge protection. After presenting 
four cases in which a knowledge risk materializes, 
lessons learned for research as well as for practice are 
discussed. 
 
2. Related work 
 
Knowledge protection is defined as the collection 
of the formal practices that organizations enforce and 
the informal practices that individuals perform to 
prevent unwanted disclosure, spillover, or loss of 
knowledge [38].  
From this definition we can derive that knowledge 
risks (that the protection is done to prevent) are linked 
to incidents, where knowledge is disclosed, leaked or 
lost. According to Durst & Zieba [10] knowledge risk 
is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse 
effects of any activities engaging or related somehow 
to knowledge that can affect the functioning of an 
organization on any level. This leads us to define a 
knowledge risk incident as an knowledge-related 
event that disrupts the functioning of an organization 
or its competitive position. 
There is a number of articles that concentrate on 
reviewing the past research on knowledge protection 
and knowledge risks [e.g. 10, 16, 27]. These reviews 
more or less agree that there is much to do especially 
in terms of empirical work in this area. Understanding 
knowledge risks and the consequences of them 
ultimately requires understanding real world incidents, 
but empirical work on the topic is scarce; a lot of the 
work so far has been conceptual or theoretical in 
nature [8]. 
In addition to focusing on the definitions of 
knowledge risks, the conceptual approaches to 
knowledge risk management or knowledge protection 
range from management frameworks [e.g. 18, 32, 40] 
and conceptual models [e.g. 12, 26]; collections of 
measures [39] to taxonomies [10, 41]. Most 
conceptual works propose frameworks supporting the 
understanding of the complex phenomenon called 
knowledge risk audits better management in 
organizations. A lot of the focus in the management 
frameworks is on understanding, preventing or 
avoiding knowledge risk incidents [17, 30].  
The perspective of continuity planning that is 
present in the information security management 
literature [e.g. 6, 34] is not so much regarded in 
knowledge risk literature. A focus on continuity 
planning would encourage preparing for what to do in 
case of an incident happens [34]. However, the 
knowledge risk frameworks that draw on the 
information security neglect this aspect so far. The 
cyclical nature of the management processes can be 
interpreted to aim for learning from incidents and 
preparing for them in the future, but the actual 
continuity planning efforts are scarcely addressed in 
literature [e.g. 15, 32]. Continuity planning in the 
knowledge risk domain is instead brought up mainly 
in the context of employee turnover [4, 20, 33] 
Most of the empirical studies that concern 
knowledge risks aim to understand the perceptions on 
knowledge risks or on existing management practices 
of organizations. The range of methods used to 
achieve this general goal is broad [8]. The expectation 
in the empirical work is to discover how organizations 
protect their knowledge, and what they have done to 
proactively mitigate knowledge risks.  
The perspective of learning from failures [11] is 
not much present in the papers, although incidents may 
be discussed as a motivation for the papers [e.g. 1]. 
This does not necessarily mean that the organizations 
do not strive to learn from failures. However, it either 
indicates lack of willingness to discuss this with 
researchers, or lack of interest for failure from 
researchers, or both. For example, a google scholar 
search for “knowledge risk incident” or “knowledge 
loss incident” or “knowledge risk failure” at the time 
of writing this paper provides no results. Although a 
systematic review with a wide range of search terms 
would be needed to locate all possible discussions of 
knowledge risk incidents that may have been 
published, at present it seems, that they are not much 
willingly discussed in the open, even as anonymous 
case studies. 
The most interesting part of the definition of 
knowledge risk we use in this paper, is the “severity of 
adverse effects”, or in other terms, the consequences 
of knowledge risk incidents. For example, Ilvonen et 
al. [16] present a classification of knowledge risks and 
protection management mechanisms, but don’t really 
touch on the consequences of knowledge risk 
incidents. Massingham [30] goes more to the direction 
of assessing the consequences, but also this approach 
leaves the consequences vague. An integral part of 
management, however, is the decision making of how 
much money is spent on different activities, and why.  
Thalmann et al. [40] propose a risk management 
framework inspired from IT-risk management: how to 
design and implement countermeasures and how to 
check if all measures are in place. In this and other 
similar research it is assumed that the measures are 
effective in preventing knowledge risk realization. 
One aspect of knowledge risks defined above is 
knowledge loss. Knowledge loss due to leaving 
employees is one of the more studied areas connected 
to knowledge risks [e.g. 18, 23, 31]. Even in this 
domain studying the impact of knowledge risk 
incidents empirically is scarce [e.g. 31] and the 
perspective of response is lacking. 
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Research on real incidents is important to better 
understand the nature of knowledge risk itself and to 
investigate the effectiveness of organizational risk 
management frameworks. The authors acknowledge 
that investigating real incidents is challenging as this 
is a sensitive topic, however it is important for further 
developing the research on knowledge risks. As 
knowledge risk management is heavily inspired by 
information security management [19], we should also 
follow the research tradition of information security 
management and rigorously investigate and learn from 
incidents. 
 
3. Method 
 
This paper presents a secondary analysis [37] of three 
studies focusing on knowledge risks and knowledge 
protection conducted between 2012 and 2018. 
Although secondary analysis as a research method is 
more widely used in the health care sector [37], 
especially because it is suitable for studying sensitive 
issues, it is sometimes used also in Information 
Systems research e.g. [2, 5].  
As the perspective of learning from knowledge risk 
incidents rose as an interesting perspective to us, we 
went back to our previous interview materials, and 
further analyzed the scarce mentions of knowledge 
risk incidents present in our interview transcripts.  
We had asked about knowledge risk realization in 
all our three interview studies, but only very few 
interviewees answered directly. Most of the 
interviewees avoided the issue and answered on 
abstract levels and we focused the interview 
discussion on other knowledge risk aspects as risk 
incidents were not the focus of the study at the time. 
The interviewees who talked about the incidents were 
also concerned about linking an incident directly with 
their company. Hence, after re-coding of the 
transcripts we realized that risk realization is a highly 
sensitive topic. 
Overall, we re-analyzed three studies with a total 
of 129 interviewees (see table 1 for details). All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed and had a 
focus on knowledge protection and knowledge risks 
and were analyzed, i.e. coded previously by one of the 
authors. For the purpose of this paper, we recoded the 
interviews focusing on knowledge risk realization and 
incidents. Due to different interview languages, i.e. 
English, Finnish and German every author coded the 
interviews he or she conducted, and we had various 
synchronization meetings about the emerged code 
set´s. Finally, we identified four cases where an actual 
incident and the consequences were discussed by the 
interviewees.  
 
Table 1. Interview material 
ID No of 
Interviewees 
duration Countries Year 
conducted 
#1 7 avg 55 
minutes 
FI 2012 
#2 91 avg 62 
minutes 
AT, DE, 
UK 
2013 
and 2014 
#3 31 avg 40 
minutes 
AT, CH, 
DE, IT, PT  
2017 
and 2018 
 
Our experience as researchers is that knowledge 
protection is a topic that organizations treat with 
caution and are not willing to disclose detailed 
information about concrete incidents and in particular 
about their impact. In fact, in some cases the condition 
for agreeing to the interview has been that details of 
what has happened in the organization are not 
discussed. Despite the shortcomings of the data, the 
cases that are presented in this paper warrant attention. 
 
4. Four cases of incidents 
Based on our analysis we present four cases: case 
4.1 has is origin in study #3, case 4.2 and 4.3 in study 
#2 and case 4.4. in study #1. 
 
4.1 Violation of trust 
  
The first case considers the trust between 
organizations, and the consequent risk that this trust is 
violated. In this case a small tool manufacturer shared 
details of a product (construction plans) and also 
production details with a large enterprise that was also 
one of its main customers. The tool manufacturer 
shared many details of its products with the large 
enterprise, because of a long and successful business 
relationship and due to the high importance (revenue 
share) of this big customer. But the interviewee 
described what happens if you do not spend enough 
efforts into protection: 
“No no it’s worthwhile to take any action to 
protect. It’s worthwhile. For example, one of our 
<name of tool> was copied in China. But 
unfortunately, this was due to some un-loyal 
customer. So, you cannot … when talking about 
trust it’s that …a customer asked [this company in 
China] to copy one of our tools to buy it cheaper. 
So when you have this kind of customers … you are 
completely defeated. So, you cannot do anything. 
You can only react. […] But … also after this fact 
that happened, so we are very sensitive to any kind 
of information we give outside. Very sensitive.” 
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The interviewee also concluded that collaboration 
with trust and without protection might be the best 
basis for a fruitful knowledge-based collaboration, but 
a company should never solely rely on trust as they 
then have no other measures to react.  
“If I trust the other party and I don’t expect 
surprises, so very honest very clear and so on, I 
believe that for me it is the best way of getting the 
maximum output of the collaboration. […] but not 
just be to open, you know […] I am not talking 
about the Open Kimono approach, okay? I don’t 
know if you understand what I’m talking about 
when I say Open Kimono. Japanese they say Open 
Kimono it means that usually Japanese they are 
naked under the Kimono. So when they open the 
Kimono they show them completely naked.” 
Within the interview it became clear that the 
incident with the un-loyal customer really shaped the 
mind of the interviewee and consequently the mindset 
of the company. The situation of not having the control 
over the process and the perception that “you can only 
react”, really made him and his company more careful. 
Additionally, to the financial losses, this insecurity 
around the case required massive management 
attention and caused a massive cognitive load to all 
involved people. Hence, he and his company are very 
keen of maintaining control and not to be “naked under 
the kimono” anymore. 
 
4.2 Spillover 
  
In our second case, concerning knowledge 
spillover, the owner of a small electrical engineering 
company reported about an innovation he made to 
control the bacteria within a pig breeding ventilation 
system. The control mechanism ensured that the 
bacteria in the air ventilation reduced the smell of the 
pigs significantly, which enhanced the acceptance of 
pig breeding in the area. The electrical engineer was 
fully aware that this control mechanism was an 
important competitive advantage in the market, and he 
acquired lots of lucrative contracts based on this 
technology. 
“The control mechanism for the chemicals and 
the bacteria was key and we protected the 
knowledge in such a way that nobody can get it. 
This is crucial, because apart from the control the 
rest of the installation is trivial and anybody can 
do this. But the contract is coupled, and we did this 
four years more or less exclusively in northern 
Germany.” 
To secure this knowledge, he actively protected 
this knowledge by applying technical measures such 
as encryption, he instructed his employees and talked 
very carefully about this innovation. Additionally, the 
company also applied measures to make reverse 
engineering more challenging as well as measures to 
confuse his competitors. He was very aware of the 
threat and of the main competitors: 
“Dominantly we used technical measures, like 
encryption but we also added additional things to 
the control unit to make reverse engineering more 
challenging. Secrecy was strictly enforced, and we 
also tried to confuse our competitors by spreading 
fake information. But if you have a competitive 
advantage in the market, your competitors will try 
everything to get it and what you can do is to gain 
time by such measures.” 
He was successful with his knowledge protection 
strategy, but after four years the competitors were able 
to reverse engineer the control mechanism. The 
contract volume of 500.000€ per year (which is 
substantial for an SME with 20 employees) has since 
diminished 
“We defended this exclusive knowledge "tooth 
and nail" for four years, which secured us ½ 
million € revenue each year. But now the 
knowledge is out, and we don't get the contracts 
anymore. Because other companies are cheaper or 
more close to the customer.” 
This shows clearly that knowledge protection pays 
off and that knowledge spillover can result in concrete 
financial losses. We also asked the owner of this 
construction company about patenting: 
“Patenting is something for large enterprises 
having lots of money and tough lawyers. If I patent 
this control mechanism it is away, as I have to 
make this mechanism publicly available. Others 
could adapt this easily and I do not have the money 
to fight a lawsuit and the success is also 
questionable.” 
Hence, the interviewee clearly described the 
limitation of formal legal protection measures for 
process knowledge and especially the challenge of 
enforcing legal measures as a small company. 
  
4.3 Immature Idea 
  
The third case considers the complex risks related 
to immature ideas. In this case an innovation manager 
from a small company operating in the field of medical 
engineering reported about an incident. He had an idea 
how to construct an implant in a more robust way, but 
he needed process knowledge how to create suitable 
molds for the product. Thus, he joined a network 
meeting of his local network dealing with life science 
topics. Many different companies from the region 
interested in the topic participated and he talked with 
several experts from the material sciences. 
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“Talking with people from other domains is 
usually most interesting, you get fresh ideas and 
for some innovative projects you just need other 
partners, especially as a small company.” 
Intentionally (to protect the idea), he never 
explained his new idea in detail, but asked questions. 
His strategy was to discuss on a high level with the 
other companies in order to identify the right partner 
for implementation. He was convinced that without 
specific knowledge about the application domain of 
the implant the idea was protected. 
“If you talk with your competitors from your 
domain, they have more or less the same mindset 
and background knowledge. We will understand 
soon. If you discuss your idea with people from 
other fields, sure - you have to be careful, but it's 
unlikely that they will understand and even if they 
understand the idea, it's unlikely that they will 
exploit your idea.” 
However, there was also a competitor in the room 
who had a trusted relationship with one of the material 
sciences companies. This person talked with his friend 
and they discovered the idea of the innovation 
manager. 
“However, never say never! In this case I 
talked with a material science guy and he was 
extremely interested and very competent. He had 
lots of good ideas and comments and talked more 
and more. It is a giving and taking and you get trust 
over time, and of course I wanted to find a 
collaboration partner for implementing my idea. 
But he had already a working relationship with one 
of my competitors and yes the idea was away!”    
The interviewee explained that he balanced 
knowledge sharing and protection in a sense that if he 
perceived a good return, he would also disclose more 
knowledge. This on the one hand because he wants to 
push the discussion, and on the other hand because he 
wanted to build trust during the conversation. 
However, the wiggle room is not so big for ideas as he 
explained: 
“You know an idea has not so many details you 
can hide - it is like a raw egg with a soft skin. You 
have to find the solution way - the shell, it is the 
novelty and exclusiveness which counts for an 
idea.” 
As he reflects, an idea is very sensitive and like a 
raw egg. The complexity is very low, in this context 
you cannot hide many details and hence it is relatively 
easy for a knowledgeable expert to grasp the core idea. 
The other person together with the material science 
company finally pushed the idea to a product and the 
innovation manager was not able to monetize his idea. 
“They did it! I did not manage to find a suitable 
partner in time and finally they exploited the idea 
first.” 
Because of the market structure and the size of the 
company he did not follow-up on this idea and it was 
a lost opportunity for the company. 
 
4.4 Turnover 
 
The last case we discuss is turnover of employees. 
Employee turnover can have multiple reasons, and this 
was a theme that was widely discussed in some of the 
interviews. However, the discussion of actual 
incidents caused by turnover in more detail was not so 
common. In this section we bring out two incident 
situations: retirement of a long-term manager, and an 
unexpected death of an employee. 
“there is always a threat that knowledge will 
leave the company. … We don’t have a solid chain 
of supervisors who would think about knowledge 
[and its continuance]. We have a project 
organization, and the project manager does not 
necessarily think about the knowledge from the 
development point of view as much as from the 
user point of view” 
As this interview quote from a middle-sized 
company highlights, the risks linked to knowledge 
turnover need to be identified. If the managers are not 
interested in the long-term development of the 
organization, they do not necessarily focus on the 
importance of individual employees to the long-term 
survival of the organization. The situation is particular 
challenging when the person leaving is the person who 
should do the identification: when the manager leaves. 
This happened in the interviewed company. 
“There is actually only one person who knows 
all our customers and how to do business with 
them, and the customer entity. And now when this 
person is going to retire, we have established this 
sort of master-apprentice setting to approach this 
problem. The apprentice will follow along for 
almost a year. And this is done solely because of 
the knowledge. On account of the person who is 
retiring, I don’t think there is a single document 
about what he has been doing for the past [few] 
years” 
In the company the retiring senior manager had 
clearly managed to recruit the right people and despite 
shortcomings in his own documentation process, 
instilled an attitude of protecting the organization 
against turnover and stagnation, since the same 
interviewees highlighted the importance of change in 
work roles. 
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“there is this thing called the half-life of a 
manager. In five years, their efficiency will halve. 
In five years, they get stuck in routines and stop 
creating new things, so it is also not good to have 
one person in the same position as long as possible 
and in that way be efficient” 
Perhaps nowadays the company has learned from 
the painful process of replacing the retired manager 
and foster the attitude described in the latter quote of 
need for change in manager roles regularly.  
The first risk linked to knowledge loss because of 
turnover is that knowledge is lost and not usable for 
the benefit of the organization. The second risk linked 
to turnover is too little of it, which can lead to 
stagnation and knowledge decay. Even if people stay 
in the same organization, their role should be renewed 
every now and then, so that they are “forced” to learn 
new things and teach things to others. In the case of 
the retiring manager, it may be that the organization 
suffers from both: first, the manager being stuck in 
their routines for a long time, and thus declining in 
their creativity and productivity, and second, the 
manager leaving and causing a lot of effort to transfer 
their knowledge before retirement. 
The risk of a leaving employee is easier to tackle if 
there is time to prepare and the retiring person is 
available for knowledge transfer. Sometimes, 
however, employees are lost unexpectedly to accidents 
or illness, which happened in another company. 
“One very experienced designer died. We have 
missed the knowledge that he had. At least you 
realize [the value] when you don’t have [the 
knowledge] anymore.” 
In a case like this, if the valuable knowledge has 
not been identified, and the presence of the people has 
been taken for granted, there is little that can be done 
as a reaction. Proactive knowledge identification and 
transfer is the only means of mitigating risks like this, 
and hence, learning from the incident for future is 
essential. 
 
5. Discussion of results 
  
The analysis of our four cases shows that 
knowledge risk incidents can have serious effects for 
companies and that both preventive and reactive 
measures are justified. Even if none of the four 
companies got bankrupt, the effects are serious. In the 
spill-over case the owner made very clear estimations 
about the loss, but at the same time also highlights that 
his strict knowledge protection measures of the last 
four years secured additional revenues. Thus, for him 
the knowledge protection measures clearly paid off 
and he could assign 500.000€ revenue to his measures 
per year. 
For the violation of trust case, the interviewee 
described the incident as very critical as it affected a 
major product of the company. Even if he could not 
quantify the loss, he made clear that this was an 
existential threat. This is like the turnover case, in 
which the impact is clear and serious but difficult to 
quantify. In the immature idea case, a business 
opportunity is lost. The risk is more focused on future 
business than on the current business and thus difficult 
to quantify. Despite the challenge, the interviewee 
made clear that this was an important business 
opportunity and that he should have given more 
attention to protection. 
A second important insight of our analysis is that it 
is important to know the potential threat, or for the first 
three cases, to know the potential attacker well. The 
ancient war-related proverb, made famous by Sun Tzu, 
“know yourself, know your enemy” is thus highly 
relevant also for dealing with knowledge risks. In the 
spill-over case, the owner had a very clear idea who 
would be the attacker and he designed the measures 
accordingly. One of the main reasons for successfully 
hiding the knowledge for four years was the adept 
competitor analysis.  
In contrast to this, not understanding the potential 
attacker caused the incidents in the violation of trust as 
well as the immature idea case. In the violation of trust 
case the company simply did not anticipate that their 
big customer would forward the knowledge to a 
Chinese competitor. Similar in the immature idea case, 
here the interviewee did not expect that his 
conversation partner would exploit the idea. In both 
cases, the interviewee said that a more rigorous 
analysis of their sharing partners could have helped to 
avoid these incidents, which is in line with literature 
[e.g. 29, 41]. However, the emphasis here is on the 
word could. In addition to helping in preventing the 
incidents from happening, analyzing the situation 
beforehand to create a plan in case the spillover or 
violation of trust happens, might have helped the 
organizations with their recovery. 
In the turnover case, it seems clear that knowing 
the threat in advance allows to take suitable 
countermeasures, i.e. distributing the critical 
knowledge to other employees. Retirement as an 
unavoidable knowledge loss incident has also received 
a lot of attention in the literature [e.g. 8, 18]. Despite 
this attention, and an older case, we argue that 
acknowledging this threat could be done more 
promptly in many organizations. Although there are 
literature that discuss the importance of threat 
assessment also in connection with knowledge [8, 15, 
16, 41], the term threat is often linked to sources that 
come from outside the organization. In case of 
turnover, the threat and “attack” comes from inside. 
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Although natural and unavoidable, employee turnover 
needs to be also seen as a threat, so that proper 
measures and reaction plans can be put in place. 
Our cases also show that knowing the competitors 
and taking preventive measures does not always help 
to avoid a knowledge risk incident at all. In the spill-
over case the owner was fully aware that he will not be 
able to protect the knowledge forever, but the 
prevention of the spillover for two years was a success 
for him. Hence, delaying knowledge risk incidents can 
be a reasonable goal for knowledge protection 
strategy, as is also discussed in literature [e.g. 1].  
The goal of delaying as the goal of knowledge 
protection is important as it also influences the design 
of the protection measures. Thus, not only the 
knowledge itself, the threat and the potential attacker 
are important decision variables, but also the 
protection extent and the protection period. Regarding 
the knowledge itself, the immature idea case clearly 
showed that the suitability of protection measures 
depends on the maturity of knowledge. As immature 
knowledge is less complex, it is more challenging to 
leave details out as a protection strategy [3]. Hence, 
the analysis of the communication partner is even 
more important and sharing with less-proximate 
sharing partners is one suitable protection strategy for 
immature knowledge [28]. 
Our analysis of the related work showed that 
knowledge risk and protection literature mainly focus 
on preventive strategies and measures so far. Our four 
cases also provided evidence for the suitability of this 
approach. However, the analysis of all four cases also 
shows a need for reactive measures having a clear 
after-incident strategy and a plan if a knowledge risk 
incident happens. 
In the turnover case, the interviewee reported about 
the frustrating experience of managing the knowledge 
loss and how his company was now damned to 
reactions to the competitor instead of setting proactive 
actions. In this case it became also clear that only a 
good strategy to block the sequences of the unwanted 
knowledge spillover prevented the company from 
really serious consequences. 
In the spillover and the immature idea case, both 
had no reaction plan. For the spillover case this was 
not intended as delaying was the goal. Nevertheless, it 
is not clear if countermeasures would have 
additionally delayed the knowledge assimilation by 
competitors. For the immature idea case also no 
strategy or plan was in place and thus the competitor 
could exploit the idea easily. Even if the knowledge 
protection literature rarely discusses “reaction plans” 
for incidents, this is a standard procedure in other 
related domains [34] and thus application of the 
incident planning approach to knowledge risks could 
draw on these domains. 
In all four cases, the interviewees critically 
reflected the cases with us in the interviews. But in 
none of the four companies was a systematic “learning 
from failure” procedure in place. In the turnover case 
and the immature knowledge case, the interviewees 
pointed very clearly out that they learned from the 
incident and that they will draw conclusions from it. 
In the turnover case it became clear that lessons 
learned were also communicated within the 
organization, but it is not clear if concrete measures or 
organizational practices are implemented in response.  
Based on our insights we argue for a systematic 
investigation of knowledge risk incidents in research 
as well as practice. Based on our secondary analysis of 
interviews we were able to get new insights and it 
seems that knowledge protection research would 
benefit from more research in this direction. 
Regarding the knowledge protection practice, we are 
convinced that organizational knowledge protection 
should also include a systematic approach to learn 
from knowledge risk incidents. Related research 
shows that organizational losses from incidents can be 
reduced dramatically by focusing on the learning cycle 
from incidents [7]. Hence, knowledge protection 
frameworks and practices should be extended in this 
regard.  
 
6. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
As a summary of the above analysis four main 
conclusions are drawn: 
1.) Knowledge risk incidents have a negative 
impact on businesses, and thus preventive and 
reactive measures are clearly justified. Further 
research on real incidents could strengthen 
this justification. 
2.) Knowing the potential attacker and their 
motivations is important for employing 
successful preventive knowledge protection 
measures. Competitor analysis thus becomes 
also a tool for knowledge risk management, 
not just business management in general. 
3.) Some knowledge risk incidents are not 
preventable, they can be merely delayed. A 
knowledge protection strategy focusing on 
delaying knowledge spillovers can be 
economically justifiable. 
4.) Planning for knowledge risk incidents is 
important, so that organizations can recover 
faster. One part of these plans should be a 
process of learning from the incident, for the 
further improvement of the knowledge 
protection measures. 
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Based on our findings from the analysis of the four 
cases, we argue for more research on concrete 
knowledge incidents, preventive knowledge 
protection measures and a research culture focusing on 
learning from failure instead of repressing or 
forgetting incidents. This seems especially relevant in 
regard to emerging knowledge risks in data-centric 
collaborations [16, 21]. 
One possible avenue for pursuing this research is 
to locate organizations that have faced knowledge risk 
incidents and study their responses to the incidents and 
their learning from them. Although locating such 
organizations may be difficult, the mandatory 
reporting of privacy incidents and the response to them 
in Europe may provide openings to locate potential 
organizations. Based on this research, it seems 
promising to develop reactive measures as part of 
knowledge protection frameworks.  
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